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Abstract
Motivated by the growing interest in sound forecast evaluation techniques with
an emphasis on distribution tails rather than average behaviour, we investigate a
fundamental question arising in this context: Can statistical features of distribution
tails be elicitable, i.e. be the unique minimizer of an expected score? We demonstrate
that expected scores are not suitable to distinguish genuine tail properties in a very
strong sense. Specifically, we introduce the class of max-functionals, which contains
key characteristics from extreme value theory, for instance the extreme value index.
We show that its members fail to be elicitable and that their elicitation complexity
is in fact infinite under mild regularity assumptions. Further we prove that, even if
the information of a max-functional is reported via the entire distribution function,
a proper scoring rule cannot separate max-functional values. These findings high-
light the caution needed in forecast evaluation and statistical inference if relevant
information is encoded by such functionals.
Keywords: Elicitability, elicitation complexity, extreme value index, max-functional, proper scor-
ing rule, scoring function, strict consistency, tail equivalence.
2010 MSC : Primary 62C05 (62C99); 62G32
Secondary 91B06; 91B30
1 Introduction
Many of our day-to-day decisions rely on our ability to produce reasonable forecasts for
quantities of interest. For example, production planning involves forecasts on consumer
demand, decisions in farming depend on information about the likely weather condi-
tions and financial risk management uses statistical features of portfolio losses. Usually,
such quantities are modelled via a random variable Y having an unknown probability
distribution and the reasonable actions of a decision maker depend on the properties of
this distribution. Forecasts can encode such properties via real numbers, e.g. means or
quantiles of the distribution, via sets, e.g. a confidence interval, or by a report of the
whole distribution function.
When several competing forecasts are available, a crucial problem is to determine
which one is most valuable. A principled approach to this task is to compare the forecasts
to a set of realizations of Y via a scoring rule or a scoring function, see e.g. Gneiting
and Raftery (2007) and Gneiting (2011). A scoring function assigns a real-valued score
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based on a forecast and a realizing observation. If a functional, i.e. a statistical property,
of a distribution is the unique minimizer of the expected score with respect to this
distribution, it is called elicitable. Elicitability is a desirable property for comparative
forecast evaluation, where it can be used to incentivize risk-neutral forecasters to report
their beliefs (Gneiting, 2011). Moreover, elicitable functionals enable regression and M-
estimation (Fissler and Ziegel, 2016; Gneiting, 2011) and are central to various machine
learning algorithms (Frongillo and Kash, 2018; Steinwart et al., 2014). Recent theoretical
advances on scoring functions and elicitability in the real-valued case can be found in
Lambert et al. (2008), Gneiting (2011) and Steinwart et al. (2014). More general vector-
valued functionals are treated in Frongillo and Kash (2015, 2018) and Fissler and Ziegel
(2016, 2019).
Many statistical functionals such as expectations, quantiles, and expectiles are elic-
itable and there exist convenient characterizations of the corresponding classes of con-
sistent scoring functions, cf. Gneiting (2011) and the references therein. On the other
hand, several widely considered functionals fail to be elicitable, for instance the variance,
the mode (Heinrich, 2014) and the prominent financial risk measure Expected Shortfall
(ES) (Gneiting, 2011; Weber, 2006). The non-elicitability of the latter functional can
be addressed via more general notions of elicitability: Fissler and Ziegel (2016) show
that ES is jointly elicitable with the risk measure Value at Risk (VaR), where the latter
is simply an extreme quantile. In other words, ES has elicitation complexity equal to
two in the sense of Frongillo and Kash (2018). In this particular instance the elicitabil-
ity problems associated with ES can be resolved, at the cost of considering a higher
dimensional problem.
More generally, there is a recent growing interest in sound forecast evaluation tech-
niques with an emphasis on distribution tails rather than average behaviour. For instance
Friederichs and Thorarinsdottir (2012) investigate the use of scoring rules for distribu-
tion classes central to extreme value theory, and Diks et al. (2011), Lerch et al. (2017)
as well as Holzmann and Klar (2017) consider weighted scoring rules for forecasts of
distribution tails. An event-based approach to evaluate whether exceedances of high
thresholds are predicted correctly is pursued by Stephenson et al. (2008) and Ferro and
Stephenson (2011). Closely connected is the verification tool of Taillardat et al. (2019)
which is based on the asymptotic behavior of the continuously ranked probability score
(CRPS), conditional on high realizations. A fundamental question arising in this con-
text is to what extent, and in which sense, statistical features of distribution tails are
elicitable. The latter problem is the central theme of this manuscript.
In our approach to this question we introduce the concept of max-functionals which
naturally arises from a key feature shared by the statistical functionals that are typically
considered in extreme value theory. We demonstrate that max-functionals fail to be
elicitable in a very strong sense. Consequently, it is natural to ask whether part of the
problem can be mitigated by abandoning point forecasts in favor of reports of the entire
distribution function. In this regard we generalize a result by Taillardat et al. (2019)
and show that it is an inherent property of all proper scoring rules that they cannot
perfectly distinguish among different max-functional values.
The manuscript is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the three notions
of elicitability that are used in the recent literature. Section 3 introduces the class
of max-functionals and shows that they cannot be elicitable and that their elicitation
complexity is infinite under mild assumptions. Section 4 provides examples of widely
used max-functionals. In Section 5 we turn to reports of entire distributions. We show
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that arbitrary large differences in tail behaviour, either quantified by tail equivalence
or max-functionals, can remain undetected by proper scoring rules. Section 6 concludes
with a discussion of the results.
2 Prerequisites: Elicitability and elicitation complexity
For the reader’s convenience this section recalls the central definitions of elicitability
and reviews basic findings. A more detailed overview of the existing literature is given
in Fissler and Ziegel (2016) and Gneiting (2011), whose notation we follow here. Let
O ⊆ Rd be a fixed set, called observation domain, equipped with Borel σ-algebra O. We
use F to denote a collection of probability distributions on (O,O), whilst also identifying
probability distributions with their cumulative distribution functions. A functional will
be a mapping T : F → A where A ⊆ Rn is called action domain. A measurable function
g : O→ R is called F-integrable if it is integrable with respect to all F ∈ F . Analogously,
a function g : A× O→ R is called F-integrable if for all x ∈ A the function y 7→ g(x, y)
is integrable with respect to all F ∈ F . We use the short notation
h¯(F ) :=
∫
O
h(y) dF (y) and g¯(x, F ) :=
∫
O
g(x, y) dF (y)
for F-integrable functions h, g and x ∈ A, F ∈ F .
Scoring functions and Elicitability In the following, S : A × O → R denotes a
scoring function, i.e. an F-integrable function. The central concepts connecting scoring
functions and statistical functionals are consistency and elicitability.
Definition 2.1 (Consistency). A scoring function S : A× O→ R is F-consistent for a
functional T : F → A if for all x ∈ A and F ∈ F we have S¯(x, F ) ≥ S¯(T (F ), F ). It is
called strictly F-consistent for T if it is F-consistent for T and for all x ∈ A and F ∈ F
the equality S¯(x, F ) = S¯(T (F ), F ) implies x = T (F ).
Definition 2.2 ((Joint) elicitability). A functional T : F → A ⊆ Rn is called elicitable
if there exists a strictly F-consistent scoring function for T . It is called jointly elicitable
with the functional T ′ : F → A′ ⊆ Rk if (T, T ′) is an elicitable functional.
An important necessary condition that a statistical functional needs to satisfy in
order to be elicitable is convexity of level sets, which goes back to Osband (1985), cf. for
instance Gneiting (2011, Theorem 6) and Lambert et al. (2008, Lemma 1) for a proof.
Theorem 2.3 (Convexity of level sets). Let T : F → A be an elicitable functional. If
F0, F1 ∈ F and λ ∈ (0, 1) are such that Fλ = λF1 + (1 − λ)F0 ∈ F , then T (F0) =
T (F1) = t implies T (Fλ) = t.
Example 2.4. The simplest example of an elicitable functional is the mean of a distri-
bution. More precisely, let g : O→ R be such that g and g2 are F-integrable and define
T : F → R via T (F ) = g¯(F ). Then T is elicitable with a strictly F-consistent scoring
function given by S(x, y) = (x− g(y))2, the ubiquitous squared error loss. Likewise, the
moment functionals defined via Tk(F ) :=
∫
yk dF (y) for k ∈ N are elicitable.
A simple example of a non-elicitable functional is the variance functional Tvar(F ) :=
T2(F )−T1(F )2, whose non-elicitability follows directly from Theorem 2.3. Nevertheless,
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Tvar is jointly elicitable since the vector (T1, Tvar) can be obtained from the elicitable
vector (T1, T2) via a bijection and hence it is elicitable, see e.g. Gneiting (2011, Theo-
rem 4). Another notable property is that on every subset of F where T1 is constant,
Tvar reduces to a shifted version of the second moment T2 and is thus elicitable on this
subset. That is, Tvar is conditionally elicitable given T1 in the following sense.
Definition 2.5 (Conditional elicitability). Let T : F → A ⊆ Rn and T ′ : F → A′ ⊆ Rk
be functionals and let T ′ be elicitable. For any x ∈ A′ define the set
Fx := {F ∈ F | T ′(F ) = x}.
Then the functional T is called conditionally elicitable given T ′ if for any x ∈ A′ its
restriction to the class Fx is elicitable.
The concept of conditional elicitability was first introduced by Emmer et al. (2015)
and motivated by a conditional backtesting approach for Expected Shortfall (ES) fore-
casts. A slight generalization was given by Fissler and Ziegel (2016). Our definition
coincides with the one from Fissler and Ziegel (2016) except that we drop the condition
that T ′ has elicitable components and only require it to be elicitable. This allows for a
more convenient presentation of our results below.
Neither joint elicitability nor conditional elicitability imply elicitability, which fol-
lows from Example 2.4 with the variance functional serving as a counterexample. If a
functional T is jointly elicitable with the functional T ′, and T ′ is elicitable, then it is
conditionally elicitable given T ′. Conversely, as discussed in Fissler and Ziegel (2016), it
is unclear under which conditions a conditionally elicitable functional is jointly elicitable.
Elicitation complexity The definitions of joint elicitability and conditional elicitabil-
ity both require a second elicitable functional T ′ accompanying the functional of interest.
The distinction between both functionals is made more explicit in the concept of elic-
itation complexity. To illustrate this, recall Example 2.4 and note that the variance
functional satisfies Tvar = f(T1, T2), where f(x1, x2) = x2−x21. Since T1 and T2 are elic-
itable, we say that the variance functional has complexity 2. In general, T has elicitation
complexity at most k if there is an elicitable functional T ′ : F → A′ ⊆ Rk such that
T = f(T ′) holds. Any f and T ′ satisfying this condition are then called link function
and intermediate functional, respectively. The smallest dimension k for which such a
representation is feasible is the elicitation complexity.
Definition 2.6 (Elicitation complexity). For any set of distribution functions F the set
of Rk-valued elicitable functionals defined on F is denoted via Ek(F). For a functional
T : F → A ⊆ R and sets Ck ⊆ Ek(F) the elicitation complexity of T with respect to
(Ck)k∈N is defined via
elic(T ) := min{k ∈ N | ∃T ′ ∈ Ck such that T = f ◦ T ′ for some f : T ′(F)→ A}.
If the minimum is not attained for any k ∈ N, the elicitation complexity of T with
respect to (Ck)k∈N is infinite and we write elic(T ) =∞.
Elicitation complexity was introduced by Lambert et al. (2008) and further analyzed
in Frongillo and Kash (2018), the latter motivated by its role in empirical risk mini-
mization (ERM) algorithms in machine learning. Intuitively speaking, it replaces the
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question whether a functional is elicitable by the question how complex it is to elicit the
functional.
If no regularity conditions are imposed on f or T ′, this can lead to small complexities
without clear benefits in applications. More precisely, if f is arbitrary and Ck = Ek(F)
is chosen, pathological choices of f , like bijections from Rk to R, cause all functionals to
have complexity 1, as demonstrated by Frongillo and Kash (2018, Remark 2). To avoid
such problems, it is standard to choose suitable subclasses Ck of intermediate functionals.
One possible choice, which is used by Frongillo and Kash (2018) as well as Dearborn and
Frongillo (2019), is Ck := Ik(F)∩Ek(F), where Ik(F) is the set of Rk-valued identifiable
functionals on F . Another possibility, implicitly used by Lambert et al. (2008) is to
define Ck to be a subclass of all functionals which have elicitable components.
Lastly, it is also possible to impose regularity on the link function f , e.g. by requiring
differentiability or continuity. Notably, joint elicitability can be understood as a version
of elicitation complexity where the link function is the projection on the last component
(Frongillo and Kash, 2018).
We need to be cautious when interpreting elicitation complexity, since imposing dif-
ferent regularity conditions via (Ck)k∈N can lead to different elicitation complexities for
the same functional, see Frongillo and Kash (2018, Subsection 2.2) for an example. In
particular, some Rk-valued functional might be elicitable and simultaneously have elic-
itation complexity strictly greater than k. Conversely, a functional can have elicitation
complexity 1, although it is not itself elicitable, as illustrated in Frongillo and Kash
(2018, Remark 1).
We conclude this section with a lemma which considers the properties of a functional
T if it is restricted to some subclass F2 ⊆ F . The first statement corresponds to the
first part of Lemma 2.11 of Fissler and Ziegel (2015), the second and third statement
are simple extensions. Their proofs are straightforward and therefore omitted.
Lemma 2.7. Let T : F → A be a functional and let F2 ⊆ F be non-empty.
(a) If T is elicitable, then the restricted functional T|F2 is elicitable.
(b) If elic(T ) = k with respect to (Ck)k∈N and we define C2k := {T ′|F2 | T ′ ∈ Ck}, then
elic(T|F2) ≤ k with respect to (C2k)k∈N.
(c) If elic(T ) = k with respect to (Ck)k∈N and sets (C′k)k∈N satisfy Ck ⊆ C′k for all k ∈ N,
then elic(T ) ≤ k with respect to (C′k)k∈N.
3 The elicitation complexity of max-functionals
This section introduces max-functionals, the central objects of our study, and investigates
their elicitability as well as their elicitation complexity. Henceforth, let F always denote
a convex class of distributions.
Definition 3.1. A functional T : F → R is called max-functional if
T (λF1 + (1− λ)F0) = max(T (F0), T (F1))
holds for all F0, F1 ∈ F and λ ∈ (0, 1).
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The essential feature of a max-functional is that its value on convex combinations of
distributions is determined by the values attained on the extreme points. Equivalently,
we can also define min-functionals and all results carry over with minor modifications.
The constant functional is the simplest max-functional, but we will usually not be in-
terested in this trivial case. Instead, Section 4 collects some non-trivial examples of
max-functionals that are routinely considered in extreme value theory. Also note that,
by definition, restrictions of max-functionals to a certain set of values are again max-
functionals.
Lemma 3.2. Let T : F → R be a max-functional and A ⊂ R a set. Set FA := {F ∈ F |
T (F ) ∈ A}, then FA is convex and the restricted functional T : FA → A ⊂ R is also a
max-functional.
Non-elicitability of max-functionals We start by proving that max-functionals
cannot be elicitable. As remarked in Section 2 the usual way to show that a functional
is not elicitable consists of applying Theorem 2.3, i.e. showing that it fails to have
convex level sets. However, any max-functional has convex level sets by definition. So
this approach is not feasible, as in the case of the mode functional (Heinrich, 2014).
Instead, we employ the following new criterion.
Theorem 3.3. Let T : F → A be a functional. If there are F0, F1 ∈ F such that
T (F0) 6= T (F1) and
T (λF1 + (1− λ)F0) ∈ {T (F0), T (F1)} for all λ ∈ (0, 1),
then T is not elicitable.
Proof. Set x0 := T (F0), x1 := T (F1) and Fλ := λF1+(1−λ)F0 and let x0 6= x1. Assume
that S is a strictly consistent scoring function for T . Then we have
S¯(x0, Fλ)− S¯(x1, Fλ) = λ(S¯(x0, F1)− S¯(x1, F1)) + (1− λ)(S¯(x0, F0)− S¯(x1, F0))
and the first difference S¯(x0, F1) − S¯(x1, F1) is positive, while the second difference
S¯(x0, F0) − S¯(x1, F0) is negative. Consequently, S¯(x0, Fλ) = S¯(x1, Fλ) for some λ ∈
(0, 1). Since either T (Fλ) = x0 or T (Fλ) = x1 holds by assumption, we arrive at a
contradiction.
Corollary 3.4. If T : F → R is a non-constant max-functional, then it is not elicitable.
Loosely speaking, Theorem 3.3 states that elicitable functionals cannot be piece-
wise constant on convex combinations of distributions. It is closely connected to The-
orem 2.3, but of independent interest beyond its use to establish non-elicitability for
max-functionals. Frongillo and Kash (2018) state that ‘no nonconstant finite-valued
property is identifiable’. Theorem 3.3 implies the following analogon.
Corollary 3.5. If T : F → R is a non-constant finite-valued functional, then it is not
elicitable.
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Elicitation complexity of max-functionals Turning from the elicitability question
to the elicitation complexity of max-functionals, the question of elicitation complexity
is only meaningful in relation to a family of sets (Ck)k∈N, where each set Ck ⊂ Ek(F)
is a collection of reasonably regular Rk-valued elicitable functionals, cf. Section 2. Our
major regularity requirement is mixture-continuity as in Bellini and Bignozzi (2015) and
Fissler and Ziegel (2019).
Definition 3.6. A functional T : F → A is called mixture-continuous if for all F0, F1 ∈ F
such that λF1 + (1− λ)F0 ∈ F for all λ ∈ [0, 1], the mapping
[0, 1]→ A, λ 7→ T (λF1 + (1− λ)F0)
is a continuous function.
Many statistical properties are mixture-continuous, e.g. ratios of expectations, quan-
tiles and expectiles, see Fissler and Ziegel (2019) for details. Lambert et al. (2008)
consider only continuous functionals and Fissler and Ziegel (2019) and Bellini and Big-
nozzi (2015) show that under weak assumptions, an elicitable functional T ′ is mixture-
continuous if its expected score function x 7→ S¯(x, F ) is continuous for all F ∈ F .
Therefore, a functional which is not mixture-continuous can have discontinuous expected
scores, leading to difficulties in forecast evaluation, estimation and regression.
To avoid further degenerate behaviour, we impose a richness assumption on potential
intermediate functionals T ′ in the sense that we require the image T ′(F) ⊆ Rk to have
at least non-empty interior. This assumption is natural for large enough classes F and
was, for instance, used by Fissler and Ziegel (2016, 2019) when establishing results on
consistent scoring functions for T ′.
In addition to mixture continuity, we follow Lambert et al. (2008) and consider only
functionals with elicitable components. Summarising, the first family of functionals
which we consider in our complexity result is
Uk :=
{
T ′ ∈ Ek(F)
∣∣∣∣ T ′ mixture-continuous with elicitablecomponents, int(T ′(F)) 6= ∅
}
,
where int(B) denotes the interior of a set B ⊆ Rk. Alternatively, we require that the
image T ′(F) of a potential intermediate functional T ′ has not only non-empty interior,
but is itself an open set, i.e. we consider the family
Vk :=
{
T ′ ∈ Ek(F)
∣∣∣∣ T ′ mixture-continuous with elicitablecomponents, T ′(F) open
}
.
We are now in position to consider the elicitation complexity of max-functionals with
respect to these families.
Theorem 3.7. Let T : F → R be a max-functional. Then the following hold true.
(a) T has elicitation complexity ∞ with respect to (Uk)k∈N unless T (F) contains its
supremum.
(b) T has elicitation complexity ∞ with respect to (Vk)k∈N unless T is constant.
Proof. Assume there is a k ∈ N, a surjective functional T ′ : F → A′ in Uk or Vk and a
function f : A′ → R such that T = f ◦ T ′. Without loss of generality, T ′ is surjective,
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hence its mixture-continuity together with the assumed convexity of F imply that A′
is path-connected. Since it has non-empty interior, we can choose a hyperrectangle
Q :=
∏k
i=1[ci, di] ⊆ int(A′) and consider each component of T ′ isolated on Q. To do so,
choose a component j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and a zi ∈ [ci, di] for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}\{j}. We can
then obtain Fcj ,z, Fdj ,z ∈ F such that
T ′(Fcj ,z) = (z1, . . . , zj−1, cj , zj+1, . . . , zk) and
T ′(Fdj ,z) = (z1, . . . , zj−1, dj , zj+1, . . . , zk).
All components of T ′ are elicitable and thus have convex level sets by Theorem 2.3.
Consequently, the i-th component, where i ∈ {1, . . . , k}\{j}, equals zi for all convex
combinations of Fcj ,z and Fdj ,z. If we define
A′j,z := {(z1, . . . , zj−1, x, zj+1, . . . , zk) ∈ A′ | x ∈ (cj , dj)} ⊆ Q,
the fact that the j-th component has convex level sets and is mixture-continuous implies
that for all a ∈ A′j,z there exists a λ ∈ (0, 1) with T ′(λFcj ,z + (1 − λ)Fdj ,z) = a. The
connection T = f ◦ T ′ now gives
f((z1, . . . , zj−1, x, zj+1, . . . , zk)) = f(T ′(λFcj ,z + (1− λ)Fdj ,z)
= T (λFcj ,z + (1− λ)Fdj ,z)
= max(T (Fcj ,z), T (Fdj ,z)),
for all x ∈ (cj , dj), implying that f has to be constant on the set A′j,z. Repeating this
argument for any choice of j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and zi ∈ [ci, di] with i ∈ {1, . . . , k}\{j} shows
that there is a C ∈ R such that f(q) = C for all q ∈ int(Q).
Now fix x0 ∈ int(Q). For any x1 ∈ A′ we can choose distributions F0, F1 ∈ F with
T ′(F0) = x0 and T ′(F1) = x1. Since x0 ∈ int(Q) and T ′ is mixture-continuous, there is
a small µ ∈ (0, 1) such that T ′(µF1 + (1− µ)F0) ∈ int(Q) holds. We thus obtain
C = f(T ′(µF1 + (1− µ)F0)) = T (µF1 + (1− µ)F0)
= max(T (F0), T (F1))
= max(f(x0), f(x1)) = max(C, f(x1)),
implying f(x1) ≤ C. Since x1 was arbitrary, we have f(x) ≤ C for all x ∈ A′, showing
C = supT (F) and proving statement (a).
Assume now that A′ is open. Then for every x1 ∈ A′ there is a hyperrectangle Q1 ⊆ A′
such that x1 ∈ int(Q1). Arguing as in the beginning of the proof gives f(q) = f(x1)
for all q ∈ int(Q1). So letting T ′(F1) = x1 as above we obtain a ν ∈ (0, 1) such that
T ′(νF1 + (1− ν)F0) ∈ int(Q1). This implies
C = f(T ′(µF1 + (1− µ)F0)) = max(T (F0), T (F1))
= f(T ′(νF1 + (1− ν)F0)) = f(x1).
Since x1 was arbitrary, T must be constant, proving part (b).
Theorem 3.7 implies infinite elicitation complexity of max-functionals in a wide range
of natural settings. Ultimately, our main interest lies in understanding the elicitation
complexity with respect to the more general family Uk, which imposes only very weak
assumptions on a potential intermediate functionals.
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Corollary 3.8. Let T : F → R be a max-functional and let one of the following condi-
tions be satisfied.
(i) T is unbounded.
(ii) T is surjective onto an open interval (a, b).
(iii) T is surjective onto a half-open interval [a, b).
Then T has elicitation complexity ∞ with respect to (Uk)k∈N.
Alternatively, considering elicitation complexity with respect to (Vk)k∈N amounts to
requiring more regularity for a potential intermediate functional T ′ and, in this case, all
non-constant max-functionals have infinite elicitation complexity. Lemma 2.7 further
implies that the infinite elicitation complexity of max-functionals also extends to larger
classes than the considered convex family of distribution functions F and is valid with
respect to smaller families contained in (Uk)k∈N or (Vk)k∈N.
Finally, by definition, any functional of finite elicitation complexity is conditionally
elicitable, but it is unclear whether the reverse implication holds. We thus conclude
with showing that max-functionals with infinite elicitation complexity can neither be
conditionally elicitable nor jointly elicitable.
Theorem 3.9. Let T : F → R be a max-functional such that elic(T ) = ∞ with respect
to a family (Ck)k∈N. Let T ′ : F → A′ be a functional with T ′ ∈ Cm for some m ∈ N.
Then the following hold true.
(a) T is not conditionally elicitable given T ′.
(b) T is not jointly elicitable with T ′.
Proof. For the first part assume conversely, that there is an m ∈ N and a functional
T ′ ∈ Cm such that T is conditionally elicitable given T ′. That is, T is elicitable on the
subclass Fx = {F ∈ F | T ′(F ) = x} for any x ∈ A′. By assumption, there is no link
function f such that T = f ◦ T ′ holds. Consequently, there is at least one z ∈ A′ ⊆ Rm
such that T is not constant on Fz. If z defines such a class, then it is convex due to
the elicitability of T ′ and moreover we can find F0, F1 ∈ Fz such that T (F0) 6= T (F1)
holds. Theorem 3.3 now implies that the restriction of T to Fz cannot be elicitable, a
contradiction to the conditional elicitability of T .
For the second part note that, as remarked in Section 2 and in the discussion of
Fissler and Ziegel (2016), the joint elicitability of T with an elicitable functional T ′
implies that T is conditionally elicitable given T ′. Consequently, the first part of the
proof implies the result.
We conclude this section with a technical remark. In the spirit of Frongillo and
Kash (2018), our complexity result (Theorem 3.7) employs regularity assumptions on
the possible intermediate functionals. The main assumption is that they possess elic-
itable components. Why this is essential is illustrated by the use of the hyperrectangle
Q in the proof. Intuitively, this assumption can be relaxed at the cost of more technical
arguments. The main challenge hereby is to control the values of T ′ in a small hyper-
rectangle (or ball) around some x0 ∈ int(A′). However, we did not pursue this approach
further, since we believe that our setting covers many functionals of practical interest
and at the same time illustrates the irregular behaviour that will be inherent to any link
function for a max-functional.
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4 Examples of max-functionals
Prominent examples of max-functionals, to which the results of Section 3 apply, are
routinely considered in extreme value theory and are key characteristics for the purpose
of inference on the tail of a distribution.
Upper endpoint For a real-valued random variable with distribution function F , its
upper endpoint is the supremum of its support
xF := sup{x ∈ R | F (x) < 1}.
By definition, the upper endpoint can be interpreted as a real-valued max-functional
on the convex class {F ∈ F | xF < ∞}. Bellini and Bignozzi (2015, Example 3.9)
discuss the upper endpoint under the name worst-case risk measure and show that it
is not elicitable, once further regularity conditions on the admissible scoring functions
are imposed. In light of Corollary 3.4 the non-elicitability of the upper endpoint follows
without any further assumptions. In addition it has infinite elicitation complexity in the
sense of Theorem 3.7 and Corollary 3.8.
Index of regular variation / Tail index When the upper endpoint is infinite,
another key characteristic to describe the tail behaviour of heavy-tailed distributions is
the index of regular variation. A strictly positive measurable function f satisfying
lim
x→∞
f(xt)
f(x)
= tρ
for t > 0 is called regularly varying (at infinity) with index ρ(f) ∈ R. For a distribution
F its index of regular variation is the respective index for its survival function F := 1−F ,
that is, T (F ) := ρ(F ). Its inverse T (F )−1 is also called tail index in the risk management
literature, cf. McNeil et al. (2015, Section 5.1). If the tail F is regularly varying with
(a negative) index ρ, this means that F decays essentially like a power function with
decay rate 1/ρ. Since ρ(f + g) = max(ρ(f), ρ(g)) (cf. e.g. de Haan and Ferreira (2006,
Proposition B.1.9)), the index of regular variation T is naturally a max-functional, while
the tail index T−1 is a min-functional.
Tail-separating functionals More generally, we can deduce that the property of ‘be-
ing a max-functional’ (or min-functional) is in fact inherent to all ‘tail-ordering indices’.
To make this precise, let us consider the following natural order on distribution tails.
For two distribution functions F and G with upper endpoints xF , xG ∈ R∪ {∞} we say
that G has heavier tail than F and write F <t G if
either xF < xG or xF = xG = x∗ and lim
x→x∗
F (x)
G(x)
= 0.
We say that F and G are tail equivalent and write F ∼t G if they share the same upper
endpoint xF = xG = x∗ ∈ R ∪ {∞} and
lim
x→x∗
F (x)
G(x)
∈ (0,∞).
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Note that “<t” defines a strict partial order on any set of distribution functions F
and that for tail equivalent F and G neither F <t G nor G <t F can hold. The
following proposition shows that a functional which respects the tail order “<t” is a
max-functional.
Proposition 4.1. Let T : F → R be a functional that satisfies for all F,G ∈ F
T (F )− T (G)

≤ 0 if F <t G,
≥ 0 if G <t F,
= 0 else.
Then T is a max-functional.
Proof. Let F0, F1 ∈ F and set Fλ := λF1 + (1−λ)F0 for λ ∈ (0, 1). We distinguish three
cases. If F0 <t F1, we have x
Fλ = xF1 ≥ xF0 and the identity
F λ(x)
F 1(x)
= λ+ (1− λ)F 0(x)
F 1(x)
for x < xF1 implies Fλ ∼t F1. Hence, neither Fλ <t F1 nor F1 <t Fλ can be true.
Together with T (F0) ≤ T (F1) we may conclude T (Fλ) = T (F1) = max(T (F0), T (F1)).
By symmetry, the case F1 <t F0 can be treated analogously. In the remaining case we
have neither F0 <t F1 nor F1 <t F0, so x
F1 = xF0 = xFλ =: x∗ must hold. Consequently,
lim inf
x→x∗
F λ(x)
F 1(x)
≥ λ > 0 and lim sup
x→x∗
F λ(x)
F 1(x)
<∞,
where the latter follows as the tail of F0 is not heavier than the tail of F1. This implies
that neither F1 <t Fλ nor Fλ <t F1 can hold true, which gives T (Fλ) = T (F1) =
max(T (F0), T (F1)) and concludes the proof.
Another instance of a tail-ordering functional in the sense of Proposition 4.1 is the
M-index as introduced in Cadena and Kratz (2016). If it exists, it is the unique ρ ∈ R
such that
lim
x→∞
F (x)
xρ+ε
= 0 and lim
x→∞
F (x)
xρ−ε
=∞ for all ε > 0.
It is easily seen that the M-index coincides with the index of regular variation for
distribution functions F with regularly varying tail function F . As it sorts survival
functions according to their power law decay, Proposition 4.1 implies that the M-index
is a max-functional.
Extreme value index A central characteristics of extreme value theory is the ex-
treme value index, which classifies the limiting behaviour of rescaled maxima of growing
samples from a distribution. More precisely, if there exist suitable location-scale norm-
ings an > 0, bn ∈ R such that the distribution functions Fn(x) := Fn(anx+ bn) converge
weakly to a non-degenerate distribution function G, the limiting distribution function
G is necessarily a Generalized Extreme Value Distribution (GEV). This means that up
to a location-scale normalization we have
G(x) = Gγ(x) = exp{−(1 + γx)−1/γ+ }
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for some γ = γ(F ) ∈ R, where G0(x) = exp{−e−x} for γ = 0. The distribution F is said
to be in the max-domain of attraction of G = Gγ and the shape parameter γ(F ) is the
extreme value index (EVI) of F , cf. e.g. the monographs Resnick (1987) and de Haan
and Ferreira (2006) for further background.
Let F be the class of distribution functions which are in a max-domain of attraction
for some GEV and consider first the EVI on the subclass of heavy-tailed distributions
F+ = {F ∈ F | γ(F ) > 0}. It is well-known that a distribution F ∈ F has EVI γ > 0
if and only if ρ(F ) = −γ−1, where ρ is the index of regular variation (cf. e.g. Resnick
(1987, Proposition 1.11)). Consequently, the EVI γ is also a max-functional on F+.
When considering the class of light-tailed distributions, i.e. the case γ(F ) < 0, we
need to specify an upper endpoint first in order to make ‘being a max/min-functional’
meaningful for the EVI γ. To this end, let Fx∗ = {F ∈ F | γ(F ) < 0, xF = x∗}.
Again the EVI behaviour is governed by regular variation, since γ(F ) = −γ(F∗) with
F∗(x) = F (x∗ − x−1) (cf. e.g. Resnick (1987, Proposition 1.13)). This shows that the
EVI γ is a min-functional on the class Fx∗ . Note that it is crucial to assume equal upper
endpoints, because otherwise it is not the EVI that dominates the tail behaviour, but
the upper endpoint itself.
So far, we have looked at statistical indices that classify univariate tail behaviour.
However, similar issues arise when we want to quantify joint tail behaviour in higher
dimensions. Exemplary, let us consider the coefficient of tail dependence.
Coefficient of tail dependence In order to quantify the tail behaviour of a bivariate
distribution function Ledford and Tawn (1996, 1997) introduced the coefficient of tail
dependence. For a bivariate distribution function F of a random vector (X1, X2) let us
write F i(x) := P(Xi > x), i = 1, 2 and F (x) := P(X1 > x,X2 > x) for the associated
survival functions. Suppose there is an α > 0 such that both F 1 and F 2 are regularly
varying with index −α. If in addition the joint survival function F is regularly varying
with index −α/η for some η ∈ (0, 1], the coefficient η = η(F ) is called coefficient of tail
dependence (CTD) of the bivariate distribution F . Let us consider the CTD η on the
class of bivariate distributions
Fα = {F | ρ(F 1) = ρ(F 2) = −α, ρ(F ) = −α/η for some η ∈ (0, 1]}.
Then it follows for F,G ∈ Fα that ρ(λF + (1 − λ)G) = −α/max(η(F ), η(G)) by the
properties of the index of regular variation. Hence η is a max-functional on Fα.
5 Proper scoring rules and max-functionals
In probabilistic forecasting, the whole distribution function instead of a single value
is reported to the decision maker. Analogously to a scoring function, a scoring rule
then assigns a score based on the forecasted distribution and a realizing observation.
The scoring rule is called proper if its expected score with respect to a distribution is
minimized whenever the forecast coincides with this distribution, see e.g. Gneiting and
Raftery (2007) or Dawid (2007) for recent reviews.
In light of the results of Section 3, the following approach may seem reasonable to
someone seeking information about a max-functional: Instead of single values, distri-
bution functions are reported and evaluated via proper scoring rules. Then the max-
functionals are computed from the forecasted distributions.
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If the max-functional of interest is a property of the tail, e.g. the extreme value
index, one could expect this method to work well as long as the scoring rule shows a
good performance in the tails. In order to emphasize specific regions of interests, in
particular the tails, Gneiting and Ranjan (2011) and Diks et al. (2011) combined scoring
rules with weight functions. Drawbacks and benefits of these weighted proper scoring
rules were further studied in Lerch et al. (2017) and Holzmann and Klar (2017), where
the latter propose general construction principles. A theoretical problem is pointed out
by Taillardat et al. (2019), who show that weighted versions of the continuously ranked
probability score (CRPS) cannot detect that two distributions are not tail equivalent.
This section shows that the problems detected by Taillardat et al. (2019) occur also
for max-functionals and do not depend on the specific choice of proper scoring rule.
Simply put, the expected score difference of two distributions can be arbitrarily small
while their values for a max-functional can be large. As previously, F is a convex set
of distribution functions on O ⊆ Rd. In our notation we follow Gneiting and Raftery
(2007) as well as Section 4.
Definition 5.1 (Scoring rule). A real-valued function S : F × O → R is called scoring
rule if for all F ∈ F the mapping y 7→ S(F, y) is F-integrable. The scoring rule S is
called proper if S¯(F, F ) ≤ S¯(G,F ) holds for all F,G ∈ F . It is strictly proper if it is
proper and for any F,G ∈ F the equality S¯(G,G) = S¯(F,G) implies G = F .
For clarity of presentation we require all scoring rules to be F-integrable, while
Gneiting and Raftery (2007) only require quasi-integrability. The latter means that the
expected score S¯(G,F ) is well-defined (and not necessarily finite) for all G,F ∈ F . Our
assumption of F-integrability is however only a minor restriction, which can be relaxed
as discussed below.
A popular choice of scoring rule is the (weighted) continuous ranked probability score,
abbreviated by CRPS (wCRPS). For some weight function w : R→ [0,∞) the wCRPS
is defined via
wCRPS(F, y) =
∫ ∞
−∞
w(x)(F (x)− 1(y ≤ x))2 dx
and the CRPS is obtained in the special case, where w is equal to one (Gneiting and
Ranjan, 2011; Matheson and Winkler, 1976). In order to emphasize the right tail, the
choice w(x) = 1(q ≤ x) for some threshold q ∈ R can be used. Both wCRPS and
CRPS are proper scoring rules as long as F contains only distributions with finite first
moments. In this case the CRPS is even strictly proper, while the wCRPS is only under
additional assumptions, see Gneiting and Raftery (2007), Gneiting and Ranjan (2011)
and Holzmann and Klar (2017).
As demonstrated by Taillardat et al. (2019, Section 2), the wCRPS is not able to
clearly distinguish between different tail behavior. More precisely, given a distribution
G and ε > 0, it is always possible to construct a distribution F that is not tail equivalent
to G and such that
|EwCRPS(G, Y )− EwCRPS(F, Y )| ≤ ε,
where Y has distribution G. This results shows that for any distribution G the tail
can be modified while keeping the expected wCRPS ε-close to its minimum. As put by
Taillardat et al. (2019) this means that the wCRPS is not a tail equivalent score.
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In the following we show that all proper scoring rules fail to be tail equivalent in this
sense. Moreover, we extend these findings to max-functionals, i.e. we show that no proper
scoring rule is max-functional equivalent. Both findings are immediate consequences of
the subsequent continuity considerations for scoring rules.
Definition 5.2. A scoring rule S : F ×O→ R is called diagonal-continuous at G if for
all F ∈ F
S¯(λF + (1− λ)G,G)→ S¯(G,G) for λ ↓ 0.
Lemma 5.3. If S : F × O → R is a proper scoring rule, it is diagonal-continuous at
each G ∈ F .
Proof. We proceed similar to the proof of Nau (1985, Proposition 3). Let F,G ∈ F and
denote Fλ := λF + (1− λ)G for λ ∈ [0, 1). We obtain the inequality
(1− λ)S¯(Fλ, G) = S¯(Fλ, Fλ)− λS¯(Fλ, F )
≤ S¯(G,Fλ)− λS¯(F, F )
= (1− λ)S¯(G,G) + λ(S¯(G,F )− S¯(F, F )),
since S is a proper scoring rule. Rearranging leads to
|S¯(λF + (1− λ)G,G)− S¯(G,G)| ≤ λ
1− λ
(
S¯(G,F )− S¯(F, F )),
for λ ∈ [0, 1) and the right hand side of this equation vanishes as λ ↓ 0.
The argument of the proof of Lemma 5.3 can be extended to quasi-integrable scoring
rules as considered in Gneiting and Raftery (2007). The additional requirement is that
the expected score S¯(G,F ) is finite and that S is regular, i.e. S¯(F, F ) ∈ R for all F ∈ F .
We can now turn our attention to the main result of this section. It is motivated
by the observation that tail equivalence and max-functionals lead to a similar kind of
discontinuity on the convex combinations λF +(1−λ)G, which intuitively conflicts with
the diagonal-continuity of proper scoring rules. This allows for an extension of the results
of Taillardat et al. (2019). Recall the tail-ordering from Section 4 and that we assume
F to be convex.
Theorem 5.4. Let S : F × R → R be a proper scoring rule and G ∈ F . Then the
following are true.
(a) If there is an F ∈ F with heavier tail than G, then for all ε > 0 there is an Fε ∈ F
that is not tail equivalent to G and such that
|S¯(Fε, G)− S¯(G,G)| ≤ ε.
(b) Let T : F → R be a max-functional. If there is an F ∈ F with T (F ) > T (G), then
for all ε > 0 there is an Fε ∈ F such that T (Fε) = T (F ) > T (G), while
|S¯(Fε, G)− S¯(G,G)| ≤ ε.
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Proof. Fix G ∈ F and let S be a proper scoring rule. For F ∈ F set Fλ := λF+(1−λ)G.
Since F is convex, we have Fλ ∈ F for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, S is diagonal-continuous
at G by Lemma 5.3, implying that for all ε > 0 and F ∈ F we can find a δ ∈ (0, 1] such
that |S¯(Fλ, G) − S¯(G,G)| ≤ ε holds for all λ ∈ [0, δ]. Now assume there is an F ∈ F
with heavier tail than G. If xF > xG, we have xFλ > xG for all λ ∈ (0, 1]. If on the
other hand xF = xG = x∗ we have
F λ(x)
G(x)
= (1− λ) + λF (x)
G(x)
,
for x < x∗ and the right-hand side goes to infinity as x → x∗. Hence, in both cases
the distributions Fλ cannot be tail equivalent to G for λ ∈ (0, 1], showing part (a).
For the second part, let F ∈ F satisfy T (F ) > T (G). Since T is a max-functional,
T (Fλ) = T (F ) > T (G) holds for λ ∈ (0, 1], proving part (b).
The first part of Theorem 5.4 shows that the lack of tail equivalence is not a flaw of
the wCRPS, but inherent to all proper scoring rules (up to integrability assumptions).
The second part extends this non-equivalence of proper scoring rules to max-functionals.
Loosely speaking, this means that there can not only be pairs of not tail equivalent
distributions, but also pairs of distributions with arbitrarily different max-functional
values, and both lead to almost identical expected scores.
6 Discussion
Recent research investigates the elicitation properties of widely used statistical function-
als. When the emphasis lies on an understanding of tail properties, typical functionals
to characterize this behaviour fall into the class of max-functionals. In particular, all
functionals that order distribution tails belong to this class (cf. Proposition 4.1). We
show here that max-functionals do not only fail to be elicitable (Theorem 3.3), but have
in fact infinite elicitation complexity in a wide range of settings (Theorem 3.7). This
contrasts situations in which the non-elicitability can be alleviated by a finite elicitation
complexity as, for instance, is the case for the variance or the Expected Shortfall (Fissler
and Ziegel, 2016; Frongillo and Kash, 2018). Rather it bears resemblance to the mode,
which is non-elicitable and has infinite elicitation complexity as well, see Heinrich (2014)
and Dearborn and Frongillo (2019). As an alternative to point forecasts, we may allow
that the max-functional is reported via the entire distribution function. In principle
such probabilistic forecasts can be compared using proper scoring rules. However, The-
orem 5.4 demonstrates that this approach does not lead to a satisfying comparison of
the associated max-functional values either, in the sense that the difference of expected
scores can be arbitrarily small, although the difference of max-functional values may be
large. This complements recent findings of Taillardat et al. (2019) and extends them
from the wCRPS to all integrable proper scoring rules.
From an applied viewpoint our result show that expected scores are not suitable to
access tail information for regression, M-estimation or comparative forecast evaluation.
Also intuitively, connecting scoring functions and genuine tail properties is obstructed
by the fact that finite samples never contain sufficiently rich information on tail be-
haviour. What might come to rescue though, is that the max-functionals themselves
are often not the main concern in practical applications, but rather a tool to guide the
extrapolation from intermediate order statistics to the functionals of interest, which may
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include for instance a high quantile. Nevertheless, the problems of proper scoring rules
presented in Theorem 5.4 cast doubt on the ability of proper weighted scoring rules to
distinguish different tail regimes and provide an alternative theoretical foundation for
the limitations of weighted scoring rules described in Lerch et al. (2017) and Holzmann
and Klar (2017). Likewise, Friederichs and Thorarinsdottir (2012) experience difficulties
in the usage of scoring rules for estimating the shape parameter of generalized extreme
value distributions. Our results illustrate that these problems are unavoidable, whenever
dealing with max-functionals or tail equivalence. We thus anticipate that techniques to
do comparative assessment of forecasts in such settings will remain an active area of
research.
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